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TRANSFER OF PUBLIC TRUST TO PRIVATE TRUSTEES
PERMITS CONTINUED SCHOOL SEGREGATION
In re Girard College Trusteeship,
391 Pa. 434, 138 d.2d 844, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 570,
rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958)
Stephen Girard's will, probated in 1831, gave two million dollars
to "the Mayor, Aldermen and -citizens of Philadelphia their successors
and assigns in trust . . ." to establish a college for "poor white male
orphans." The college was opened in 1848 under the management of
the city council, and in 18'69, as the result of an act of the state legis-
lature,1 its control was assumed by the Board of Directors of City Trusts.
On September 24, 1954, two Negro orphan boys applied for and were
denied admission to Girard College solely because of their race. Sub-
sequent litigation resulted in a per curiam decision by the Supreme Court
of the United States that:
The Board which operates Girard College is an agency
of the State of Pennsylvania. Therefore, even though the
Board was acting as a trustee, its refusal to admit Foust and
Felder to the college because they were Negroes was dis-
crimination by the State. Such discrimination is forbidden by
the Fourteenth Amendment.'
Upon remand, the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County dis-
missed the petitions and replaced the Board of City Trusts with thirteen
persons as trustees of the Girard Estate. This action was affirmed by
the Pennsylvania Supreme -Court, and upon appeal the Supreme Court
of the United States denied certiorari.3
Of course, the denial of certiorari has not made the Pennsylvania
decision the law of the United States.4 The Court's action is ambiguous,
and may have resulted simply from a policy of limitation on judicial
'PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 53 § 16365 (1957).
2 Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957).
3 1n re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 138 A.2d 844, cert. denied,
357 U.S. 570, rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958).
4,"[S]uch a denial carries with it no implication whatever regarding the
Court's views on the merits of a case which it has declined to review." Mary-
land v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 919 (1950). There are several
possible reasons why certiorari was denied: (1) The Pennsylvania decision was
correct. This does not appear to be the probable reason, however, for the Court
in holding that the city could not constitutionally administer the trust, cited
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), suggesting that Girard was
to be controlled by their attitude toward public education, which has been quite
hostile toward attempts to avoid desegregation. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1
(1958). (2) A decision on the constitutional issue could be avoided by construing
the Pennsylvania courts' actions as having complied, if only literally, with the
Court's mandate that the city could not administer a discriminatory trust. (3)
The case was not "ripe" for appellate review because there was no definitive
action by the new private trustees on Negroes' applications for admission.
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review. It is therefore quite probable that the validity of the action of
the Pennsylvania courts will soon be tested -by a new suit correcting any
procedural defects of the instant suit. The Court will then be forced
to decide if the replacement of public trustees by private trustees, solely
because the former can not enforce the racially discriminatory provision
of Girard's will, is itself a discriminatory state action.' The fourteenth
amendment provides that no state shall deny any person equal protection
of the laws; there is no prohibition on discrimination by private persons.6
To understand what constitutes a "state action," one must first determine
what each of the two words, "state" and "action" means.
The action has been held that of the "state" when accomplished by
the state legislature,7 the state judiciary, s a state agency, 9 a municipality, 10
or persons performing a quasi-governmental function such as the oper-
ation of a private primary election." A state, furthermore, cannot re-
lieve itself of constitutional restrictions by transferring the management
of its affairs to a private organization.' 2 Although Girard College was
founded on private funds, its establishment also required at least five acts
of the Pennsylvania General Assembly and forty-eight ordinances of the
Philadelphia City Council.' 3 Except as to the removal of the Board as
trustee, the instant action does not purport to invalidate any of these
statutes, so there appears to have 'been action by both the state legislature
and the city. The orphans' court, by removing the Board, and the state
supreme court, by affirming, have acted as representatives of the state in
5This problem was side-stepped by the majority who contended that "the
complained of discrimination in the instant case does not impinge upon any
civil right to which the minor petitioners have a constitutional claim along with
all other members of the community." 391 Pa. at 450, 138 A.2d at 851. Although
such reasoning rhight once have been convincing, it is difficult to embrace in view
of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts,
supra note 2. It is quite awkward to say that these Negro boys have no consti-
tutional right to admission, yet their exclusion by the city is unconstitutional
discrimination.
0 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
7 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
8 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948) ; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). The majority in the instant
case concede this point. 391 Pa. at 450, 138 A.2d at 851.
9Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, supra note 2; Nixon v. Herndon, 273
U.S. 536 (1927).
10 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
"1Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1952). Accord, Marsh v. Alabama, 326
U.S. 501 (1946); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
12 Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954). Accord,
Rice v. Elmore, i65 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948);
Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W. Va. 1948); Culver v. City of
Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N.E.2d 82 (1948).
131n re Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434, 468, 138 A.2d 844, 859
(1958) (dissent).
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
this matter. Caring for orphans is ordinarily a governmental function 14
and in the instant case the city of Philadelphia is the legal guardian of
every child admitted to Girard College until he reaches the age of
twenty-one." Under the Pennsylvania decision thirteen private persons
have 'taken over a function of the city (and hence of the state) for,
although these orphans are wards of the city, their complete care and
education is entrusted to Girard College.
The issue as to what constitutes "action" sufficiently discriminatory
on the part of the state to violate the fourteenth amendment is perhaps
more difficult to discern than what constitutes a "state". In Shelley v.
Kraemer,' it was held discriminatory state action for a state court to
order the enforcement of private restrictive convenants which would
exclude persons of designated race or color from the ownership or
occupancy of real estate. The Shelley principle was extended slightly in
Barrows v. Jackson,17 where it was held unconstitutional to award
damages for breach of a similar restrictive covenant. The rationale is
that "once courts enforce the agreement the sanction of the government
is, of course, put behind them,"'" and the private discrimination has been
adopted by its enforcement. The Pennsylvania court rejects the appli-
cation of this rationale to Girard, for, in the instant case, there has been
a judicial recognition of private discrimination and an action by the court
without which the private discrimination would be ineffectual.
Determining whether discrimination in an educational system is the
act of private persons or of the state is analogous to determining whether
there has been an infringement of the separation between church and
state, where there has 'been aid to education generally which has to some
degree benefitted parochial schools as well as public schools. The real
reason for such separation is to avoid discrimination in favor of a par-
ticular religion.'" Although there is a wall of separation between church
and state, there is not a complete "hands-off" policy. The state may
contribute economic support to education generally, provided the effect
on promotion of religious dogma is remote."0 The problem arises when
14 "A minor, deprived of parental care, control, and oversight, is considered
a person under disability, a ward of the state, over whom the state may and
should exercise its sovereign power of guardianship, through its duly constituted
agencies; and, as parens patriae, may assume for him parental authority and
duty." 43 C.J.S. Infants § 4 (1945).
15 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 53, § 16339 (1957).
16 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
17 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
18 Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 n.4 (1956).
19Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
20 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The Board reimbursed
parents for money spent for bus transportation to parochial schools as well as
public schools as a safety measure. Similarly, the state possibly could provide
free textbooks to all schools to insure uniformity, free or subsidized lunches
to all children for better nutrition, or support for teachers' salaries in all schools
to attract better qualified teachers and upgrade education generally.
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there is too much help and cooperation or when there are too many
strings attached. The question in each case should be whether the state
by its action has become so intimately associated with the private party,
either because of the enormity of a single act or the cumulative effect
of numerous smaller acts, that the state itself has become an effective
source of discrimination.
The majority of the Pennsylvania court contends that if all that is
required for unconstitutional discrimination "is state action and a racial
or religious discrimination, then no private charity created by will can
any longer dispense its benefits on the basis of race, creed or color ac-
cording as its settlor has stipulated."" This is supposedly true because
the will has no effect until it has been probated and admission of the will
to probate is a judicial action of the state. The same syllogism may pro-
duce a contrary result by merely interpreting the words "state action" in
the major premise to mean that the action of the state must be the
effective source of the discrimination. The admission of a will to probate
is basically a ministerial, passive operation as compared to the authori-
tative, positive act of the testator. Whether or not the discrimination is
that of the state or the testator should be determined on the facts of a
particular case.
In Girard, the testator evinced a dual intent: (1) that the school
be limited to white orphans, and (2) that it be publicly administered.
The college was in fact so operated, exclusively white and by the city of
Philadelphia for 110 years. It appears to be more than a mere ministerial
act for the orphans' court to remove the public trustees provided for by
Girard and replace them with private trustees in order that the exclusion
of non-white students might continue. There is not only the probate of
the will, but an action voiding a portion of it. This is a situation which
would logically call for the application of the doctrine of cy pres,29
which demands a greater degree of judicial discretion than that which
is deemed merely ministerial. Although it seems certain that a line must
be drawn beyond which the rule of Shelley v. Kraemer does not extend,
21 391 Pa. at 454, 138 A.2d at 853.
22 "If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable
purpose, and it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out
the particular purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to
devote the property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court
vill direct the application of the property to some charitable purpose which falls
within the general charitable intention of the settlor." RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS
§ 399 (1935). Application of cy pres in such a case as Girard is well-supported
by case authority. In Reeser Estate, 1 Pa. D. & C.2d 731 (0. C. Berks 1954),
a scholarship to study medicine was awarded to a girl, instead of "some reliable
boy," after the funds had accumulated for twenty years. An English case nearly
"on all fours" on its facts with Girard is In re Dominion Students Hall Trust,
[1947] 1 Ch. 183, in which a restriction to students of European origin was
removed. 4ccord, Trustees of Pittsfield Academy v. Attorney General, 95 N.H.
51, 57 A.2d 161 (1948); Exeter v. Robinson Heirs, 94 N.H. 463, 55 A.2d 622
(1947) ; In re Queen's School Chester, [1910] 1 Ch. 796.
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it does not necessarily follow that if Shelley is to control Girard it must
control cases where the only action by the state is the probate of a will
which discriminates on the basis of race, creed or color. Thus, if a settlor
provides a trust for the exclusive use of a particular ethnic or religious
group and also provides for private trustees, a contrary result in Girard
would not of necessity demand a finding that this is unconstitutional
solely because of the probate of the will. The effective source of the
discrimination is the act of the settlor, not that of the court in admitting
the will to probate.
Robert E. Lewis
